I'm Gautam, Computer Engineering @ uOttawa. I build software around the assumption that networks drop, APIs die, and hardware misbehaves. Don't take my word for it: flip the UPLINK switch in the corner and watch this page handle its own outage. Try it
This is the real AEGIS pipeline logic: detection → zone rules → state machine → alarm → async uplink, reimplemented in ~150 lines of browser JS. Workers without hard hats trigger a violation when they enter the hazard zone; the relay fires before the voice, exactly like the SCHED_FIFO ordering on the device. Now flip the UPLINK switch above and watch events buffer offline, then flush when the link returns. Nothing in the safety loop notices. Full design decisions in the engineering log. And the switch is not just a toy: turn your wifi off and reload this page. It still loads, and the switch flips itself.
Confidence-scored SOC incident triage, dual-store: MongoDB for live reads, Snowflake for analytics, so analytics never contend with real-time state. 7-test E2E suite, shipped in 24 hours.
Open a PR, get a full stack; close it and it's gone. A webhook writes desired state only, and a crash-safe reconciler advances one step per tick against idempotent providers.
Five agents turn plain English into deployed infrastructure. Approval gates, rollback, immutable audit log. Nothing reaches prod without a human.
Multi-tenant SaaS end to end: Postgres RLS, JWT and API keys, live conflict resolution over WebSockets, metering, billing, audit.
Ranks the chores you keep paying an agent to redo, from local session history that never leaves the machine. It refuses to render a partial scan as a clean null, and every missing file is named in a NOT COUNTED ledger.
Digital-twin crisis management over 14 live APIs on NATS. Led a team of 4 at uOttaHack; outages degrade, never kill.
Every scraper heals itself with AI now; nobody checks the repair was correct. Bedrock verifies each heal against golden fixtures before it ships, and every row carries a receipt naming the heals it refused.
Access governance for people and agents. Finds every grant still held, holds it at a human approval gate, and writes a verifiable audit trail of what was granted and by whom.
Offline buffering, graceful degradation, and chaos harnesses go in the initial plan, not the retro.
PROVEN · GK-002 §05: the chaos harness that caught the lossy flushEnrichment and dashboards live upstream. Correctness lives on-device, where the network can't take it away.
PROVEN · GK-002 §02: the voice baked in at build timeApproval gates, audit trails, rollback. Every autonomous system I ship can be stopped, questioned, and reversed.
PROVEN · HyperShift: nothing deploys past the approval gateMock generators, load testers, fault injection, so the stack ships while the Pi is still in the mail.
PROVEN · GK-002 §05: the upper stack shipped before the Pi arrivedA study that only reports its wins is not evidence. I pre-register the threshold, then report the number I actually got.
PROVEN · GK-005: needed 20%, got 9.8%, published in fullA measurement without its conditions is a rumour. If the harness distorts the number, that warning goes above the number, not in a footnote.
PROVEN · GK-003: WSL2-relative timings, flagged before the tableClearing your own pre-registered bar by five times is an alarm, not a triumph. The broken write-up stays published, marked do-not-cite, because deleting it makes the repo look better and the record worse.
PROVEN · GK-006: the 100% that turned out to be a dead hostnameName the number that ends the project while you still have nothing invested in the answer. Two of mine are still sitting at UNEVALUATED in public.
PROVEN · GK-004: KT-1 and KT-2 committed before the first commitA gate with an override is decorative. If a sealed rule can be amended by a flag, a config or a paid tier, the artifact is worth nothing to the person it was meant to convince.
PROVEN · GK-010: a test that fails if a code path to mutate a sealed field ever appearsA stop condition you argue your way past was never a stop condition. Three not-evaluable readings, and the pre-registered action was to archive it.
PROVEN · GK-009: both kill tests resolved against it, so the project endedFinding prior art that beats you on the job it does is uncomfortable and burying it is cheap. A security tool that hides the alternative has already told you what kind of tool it is.
PROVEN · GK-011 §06: the README recommends mcp-warden over my own projectA number whose environment was not recorded cannot be re-derived, only re-argued. I have written that caveat on other people's results and then failed to apply it to my own crawl.
PROVEN · GK-011 §08: the recrawl that disproved my own explanationBuilt Cadence, a production inventory and rental system, solo, from requirements gathering with non-technical staff to deployed software. Audited and repaired data-integrity failures and automated recurring workflows.
Explained regulated financial products to high-volume customers under strict compliance: daily practice at making complicated things understandable to people who didn't ask for the details.
Data structures & algorithms, databases, software engineering, computer architecture, discrete math, probability & statistics.
Open to co-op placements and internships in systems, infrastructure, and platform engineering. If you're building something that has to survive failure, I want to hear about it. (Email works even during the outage; it's store-and-forward. That's the point.)